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3I. Introduction
It has become trite for observers of the Arab 
Gulf states’ urban landscapes to note how dramatic 
the socioeconomic modernization of their public 
spaces has been, including not only through their 
famous megaprojects but also by the creation of new 
public spaces and the reinvigoration of heritage and 
historical sites. Hackneyed or not, such observations 
are a reminder of the new roles being seized by these 
states on the global stage, and suggest that, as much 
as regime maintenance strategies might severely limit 
the prospects for political transition in the region, 
the Gulf ’s urban spheres are certainly not immune 
from transformations in their economic prof iles, 
the embracing of new technologies and practices, 
and even changes to their social dynamics. Saudi 
Arabia has constructed grand public buildings and 
spaces, including the King Abdullah Economic City 
metropolis megaproject. Dubai is home to the world’s 
largest artificially created harbor and port (Jebel Ali), 
a so-called seven-star hotel in the Burj al-Arab, and 
of course Burj Khalifa, which at 828 meters high is 
the world’s tallest building. Qatar is now the wealthiest 
country on earth, measured in national income per 
citizen, and has constructed grand buildings and cities 
as part of its economic transformation. Various Gulf 
cities now possess world-class airlines, outposts of the 
world’s top universities, and in certain sectors such as 
petrochemicals, telecommunications or desalination, 
often globally-competitive companies. 
What is interesting is that at the same time as 
heritage and new public spaces are being nurtured by 
Gulf leaderships, so too are the symbols and meanings 
of cosmopolitanism; that is, a narrative that at its 
simplest argues that people or groups can transcend 
local and national identities to embrace being a “citizen 
of the universe”,1 and encompassing a worldview based 
on egalitarianism, sometimes also individualism, 
as well as reciprocal recognition between peoples, 
impartiality, and people connecting and conversing 
across traditional and nation-state boundaries.2 
Examples of this cosmopolitanism include shopping 
malls, family entertainment venues, and major urban 
projects like Dubai’s The World offshore housing project 
that eschew local or Arab symbolism for much broader, 
global imagery, or imaginings from other cultures 
that are sometimes blended together into something 
multicultural (or, critics might argue, non-cultural). This 
cosmopolitan focus is arguably much more surprising 
than the resurgence in heritage and nationalist 
imagery: given the relative youth of Gulf states, and the 
complexities of their societies, why would leaderships 
not opt simply to emphasize national identity and 
shared experiences when approving and designing 
megaprojects, public spaces, and major cultural sites 
and institutions? Would cosmopolitanism not, in fact, 
be a threat to national projects and extant regimes, if 
its underlying narrative is about transcending the local 
and embracing pan-national, even humanist, values and 
identities?
Scholars have barely addressed such questions. To 
be sure, they have begun producing detailed surveys and 
analyses of the Gulf ’s rise, some taking a very positive 
view towards the region’s transformation,3 and a range 
of edited volumes on the region usually also include 
reference to the economic and cultural changes taking 
place there.4 Public spaces and cultural heritage are part 
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of this transformation, even if they have gained little 
attention in scholarship apart from some brief mentions 
when assessing the Gulf ’s state “branding” and image-
making efforts, or when exploring the relationships 
between space and modernity at the broader of levels, 
often looking primarily at architecture.5 That noted, 
there has been some heritage discussion in works on 
issues such as tourism, plus an emerging body of journal 
article-length pieces on Gulf heritage,6 and a couple 
of pieces on cosmopolitanism.7 The aim of this paper 
is to examine these dynamics and, hopefully, to take a 
small step in addressing the relative paucity of debate 
around both heritage and public spaces on the one hand, 
and cosmopolitanism on the other. By putting these 
dynamics into a political economy context, the intention 
is to show how their coexistence – indeed, even a 
harmony between them at times – is not a contradiction, 
but rather a logical product of state policies that seek 
not just nation-building outcomes, but also popular 
support for, and engagement with, ambitious projects 
of economic transformation and a selective embracing 
of globalization and the changes that it is bringing to 
the region. The ultimate goal is regime legitimization, 
of course, and domestic political outcomes rather than 
globalist, cosmopolitan ones, but by virtue of its existing 
political structures and massive oil wealth, the Gulf is 
chasing this goal, it will be argued, in unique ways. In 
making this argument, cases are drawn from Dubai 
and Doha as examples, although the broad trends 
discussed here are a feature, if to varying degrees, of 
all the monarchies of the Gulf.
II. A Note on Definitions
The terms “heritage”, “public space(s)”, and 
“cosmopolitanism” form the basis of this paper, and 
are worth brief ly discussing given their fuzzy and 
sometimes contested meanings. Heritage and (urban) 
public spaces are, of course, in many respects very 
separate things. A definition of “heritage” often begins 
with that in the International Charter of Venice (1964), 
which in part defined it as covering: “…[w]orks of 
the past which have acquired cultural significance 
with the passing of time.”8 This has an implied 
emphasis on artworks and other visual expressions of 
human creativity, although in the contemporary Gulf 
heritage is equally likely to be a site or location of past 
or continuing cultural meaning, such as a village, 
marketplace, town center, cemetery, museum, opera 
house, theater, large public infrastructure work, mosque, 
or other such site. There are intangible elements to it 
too,9 and it includes festivals, concerts, and even mass 
market leisure sites such as theme parks, or natural sites 
with cultural or historical value such as national parks.10 
At its (politically) simplest, public space is a 
critical meeting point for state on the one hand and 
society and business on the other.11 Civil society often 
also uses public spaces as an arena in which to operate. 
Public spaces are by definition political because they 
are a physical space in which the “public sphere” 
exists and communicates, either with its constituent 
components or with the state.12 Identity, community 
belonging, even citizenship – some of the essences 
of politics – are discussed and negotiated in physical 
and metaphorical public spaces, but in the simplest of 
interactive engagements, the physical realm is especially 
important. As a Foucaultian concept, “space” is central 
to how power is exercised, while a range of other 
approaches grant importance to the political dynamics 
of how space is produced over time and to whose 
interests it is formed and purposes given to it.13 Within 
such analyses, political economy also has a critical role. 
Community-level transactions and other exchanges 
often occur in public spaces, and more broadly, public 
space is fundamentally what economists call a public 
good,14 making it economic in nature and not just an 
element of social and political geography. A public space 
sometimes has commonalities with a heritage site. The 
two may be collocated or overlapping; for example, 
a piece of culturally-relevant art in a city square, or 
buildings such as museums, art galleries, and theaters, 
can be at once both public spaces and heritage sites (or 
locations that preserve heritage). 
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The determining factor for a “heritage” site is 
whether it has some link to collective “memory.”15 This 
contrasts with a simple public space, which may evolve 
into a heritage site over time or instead may never 
possess any cultural value. A busy road, for example, 
may be a public space, but few are heritage sites. 
Collective memory, therefore, is seminal. This may be 
a constructed memory, or one shaped and framed by the 
state or other actors; it does not have to be organic. 
A heritage site may even contribute to a “mythology,” 
a collective narrative that articulates “the patterns of 
behavior, expressive forms and modes of silence [and] 
into which worldviews and collective sensibilities 
are translated.”16 The factual accuracy of a narrative 
underpinning or supported by a heritage site or public 
space is virtually impossible to discern, and does not 
matter much here anyway, where it is the (political) 
purposes of such sites that are of concern. 
“Cosmopolitanism” is a more complicated 
and contested concept, especially in terms of how it 
is understood in various contemporary settings and 
in how it relates to political identity, narratives, and 
meanings. Beyond the “citizen of the universe” concept 
and other basic features of it already noted, its use in 
recent times has been more multifaceted and contested. 
It (re-)emerged from the debate about globalization, 
with some scholars seeing it as a positive extension of 
globalization,17 and others seeing it as deriving from 
the universality of humankind.18 It has a substantial 
history in the Middle East. For example, elite culture 
in multicultural Arab cities such as Alexandria during 
the European eras is often described as having been 
cosmopolitan; some works treat the Ottoman period 
as having cosmopolitan aspects as well.19 Regardless, in 
contemporary scholarship, cosmopolitanism is almost 
always framed in contrast or opposition to localism, 
nationalism, and other sub-universalist units of human 
identity and loyalty.  
Finally, in the pages that follow, the term 
“pseudo-cosmopolitanism” is introduced. While 
a little clumsy too, this word seeks to capture and 
describe the underlying realities of present-day Gulf 
cosmopolitanism, which it is argued here is driven not 
by a profound humanist impulse nor a genuine attempt 
to transcend national identities, but rather uses state-
created places and spaces with supposedly-cosmopolitan 
values and narratives to serve and strengthen national 
identity and loyalty to national-level institutions. 
Certain aspects of cosmopolitanism may indeed be 
acceptable to states and regimes – they may even be 
worth endorsing and supporting – but this does not 
change the fact that cosmopolitanism is ultimately and 
primarily being appropriated for national- and local-
level political purposes.
III. Public Spaces, Heritage Sites, 
Cosmopolitanism, and Politics
Heritage sites usua l ly perform a role in 
contributing to or strengthening national historical 
narratives, in turn or also reinforcing shared cultural 
characteristics and social bonds. This extends to 
society’s sense of shared purpose with the state. As 
Ouis, who in discussing tradition as nostalgia, has 
argued: “…[h]eritage expresses the sense of nostalgia 
and alienation that many Gulfies have experienced 
during the rapid modernization [of recent decades]”, 
and tradition: “…can in fact be interpreted as reactions 
to modernity that are expressed in modern ways.”20 But 
Gulf heritage sites are also a marker of uniqueness, 
contrasting sharply with the very homogenous feel 
of the Gulf ’s modern cities and infrastructure. What 
might mark one Gulf society out from another, beyond 
less tangible components of identity such as tribal or 
family affiliations, are the finer points of their cultural 
practices and histories and thus their heritage sites. This 
is probably why there has been a renewal of interest in 
Gulf heritage; why old neighborhoods once thought 
“backward” are in fashion again, with the value of old 
places nostalgically reimagined,21 and why states have 
given it a lot of attention and funding.22 Rents such as 
oil income may be central to regime survival, but alone 
are no longer enough to guarantee it.23 By spending 
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some rents on heritage sites, regimes are nearly always 
creating a triangular political economy dynamic of some 
sort between state, society, and shared heritage. There 
is also an international dimension to this, when for 
example tourists and other foreign visitors observe and 
engage with a site – one they usually hope and expect 
will be “authentic”24 – or judge a society’s modernity 
on, at least partly, its public spaces, buildings, and 
infrastructure.25 Similarly, both public spaces and 
heritage sites are integral to the construction of national 
“brands”, targeting both a global and local audience. 
Branding seeks to send a message that a country or 
economy is a safe yet dynamic place with which to have 
strong political, economic and cultural relationships. 
Modernity and development are part of this message, 
but so too is an image of society’s ability and willingness 
to embrace both modernity and tradition. 
Cosmopolitanism is, very loosely, compatible 
with such narratives. It is sometimes forgotten that 
the region has an extensive history, especially along the 
shores of the Gulf, of cultural pluralism from trade, 
pilgrimage, and other interactions.26 Many cultural 
practices in the area are not indigenous to it, and as 
elsewhere in the Arab world, many people hold a 
range of meta-national loyalties, identifying not just by 
nation-state but also as Arab or Muslim or as a member 
of a tribal grouping that transcends national borders. 
Moreover, the large populations of foreign workers 
residing in the Gulf states mean that many parts of 
the public realm defy simple definition as “Emirati” or 
“Qatari” or reduction to any other broad nation-state 
tag. Whether cosmopolitanism is accurately presented 
by states, and no matter how it is received by societies, 
it is neither the dominant political identity of most Gulf 
citizens nor simply a state-defined artificial construct.
Across the Gulf, major public works have been 
undertaken in the past twenty or so years to construct 
large public buildings and spaces, and strong state 
support provided for the development and protection 
of historical and heritage sites and the transmission 
of historical and cultural narratives. This has been 
true across the region, with oil museums, oil wells, 
traditional villages, old neighborhoods and shopping 
streets, castles, forts, and other places restored, 
protected, or developed, often with new features such 
as museums added to them. No state has exempted 
itself from such activities. Religious sites have gained 
greater respect and attention, too, from the restoration 
of old mosques, to new Islamic art museums, to the 
preservation of locations associated with the spread 
of Islam. Historical sites, often reinvigorated and 
redeveloped, are peppered around the region, and 
much of the region has an Islamic museum of some 
sort. Qatar’s Museum of Islamic Art is world famous 
(more on which shortly). Impressive too is Bahrain’s 
Bayt al-Qur’an, an Islamic calligraphy museum 
which also plays a role in subtly asserting the Islamic 
credentials of the regime, presenting religion as a social 
bond and source of political authority.27 Even public 
recreation facilities such as Bahrain’s Lost Paradise of 
Dilmun water park can be politicized public spaces. 
Not only is it an important family recreational venue, 
but its name and the symbolism implanted in it is a 
reminder to Bahrainis of their country’s claim to be the 
site of the biblical Garden of Eden, and is thus part of 
Bahrain’s (state-supported and strongly state-led) claims 
to unique historical significance.28 Historical records 
and narratives elsewhere have also been a part of this 
trend. Madawi Al-Rasheed has noted how the recapture 
of Riyadh has been framed and promoted by the Saudi 
state,29 for example, and Sulayman Khalaf has argued 
that the Kuwaiti state has framed and overstated a story 
of the pearling history there as a case of heritage.30
The two cases focused on here are Dubai and 
Qatar. They offer a range of examples of heritage sites, 
public spaces, and other places that have strong political 
meanings imbedded in or linked to them, including 
in some cases messages about the state’s perspectives 
on certain forms of (usually pseudo-)cosmopolitanism. 
Whether genuine cases of cultural pluralization and 
hybridization, or simply parts of a nationalist narrative 
paid for with rents, the major projects of Dubai and 
Qatar contain a range of cases and messages. Both 
have undertaken massive projects along all these and 
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other lines, since the late-1980s and early 1990s in the 
case of Dubai,31 and a little later – the late 1990s, after 
the rise of Emir Hamad (ruled 1995‒2013) – in that of 
Qatar.32 Abu-Lughod’s comment on the immediate and 
immense urbanization of the Gulf in the mid-to-latter 
20th century is flowery but not exaggerated: “Seldom 
has the world seen a more striking in situ experiment 
of instant urbanization and hot-house forced social 
change.”33 
IV. The Case of Dubai
Dubai provides a plethora examples of public 
spaces with political meanings and with links to 
cosmopolitan imagery. Some of the most prominent 
include: the Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest building;34 
Dubai’s offshore archipelago housing project The 
World;35 and perhaps strangest of all, Ski Dubai, an 
indoor skiing slope and area located with the Mall of 
the Emirates.36 These places are part of its branding 
efforts, and a product of Dubai’s activist approach to 
globalization, in which it embraces many aspects of 
globalization (above all, commercial and technological 
ones) as part of its strategy of becoming the epicenter of 
the Middle East and building its wealth on this pivotal 
economic role and on the confidence established by 
its pro-globalization, pro-business, and pro-Western 
reputation. Dubai’s experiment was thus one that had 
to balance local and international goals and interests: 
like globalization itself, the policy came with potential 
positives for the ruling elite, but also a strong set of 
risks, especially from hazards to Dubai’s conservative 
social and cultural traditions inherent in globalization.37
Dubai’s megaprojects since the 1980s all keep this 
balance in mind, and indeed are driven by it. What they 
all have in common – and share with a raft of other 
such projects, too numerous to mention – is that they 
send a message that Dubai is embracing modernization 
and economic transformation, not only successfully 
adapting to it, but able to compete globally with the 
grandest cities of the world. This is a key attraction of, 
for example, Burj Khalifa, the goals of which are not 
just financial or prestige-focused (although they include 
this), but to mark Dubai as a globalized metropolis, a 
world city. Its goal was not just to break a record for 
the highest building in the world, but to “embody the 
world’s highest aspirations.”38 It is a sign of Dubai’s 
larger strategy to be a “city of superlatives and hyper-
real experiences.”39 The World, despite its financial 
setbacks, has as an underlying intention a message 
of globalization too. In fact, its shape and name are 
a crude representation of a form of cosmopolitanism, 
given its being shaped as a world map and located 
just off the coast of Dubai. It sends a message of 
the world lying at the very doorstep of Dubai. Even 
Ski Dubai has ambitious messages embedded in it. 
Its multicultural dining options and evocation of 
older images of European playboys and other bon 
vivants are all suggestive of a sophisticated, world-
class skiing destination – but one located in a desert, 
with the hot, harsh climate subjugated by modernity 
and human ingenuity. The state has been central in 
all these endeavours and in how they are presented. 
While Ski Dubai is not state-owned, it is owned by 
the Majid Al Futtaim Group, a long-established and 
well-connected local firm. The World and Burj Khalifa 
have much closer links to the state: The World is being 
developed by Nakheel Properties, a state-backed (and as 
of 2011, state-owned) firm, and was originally conceived 
by Dubai’s ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al 
Maktoum, while Burj Khalifa was also a brainchild of 
the state and built by Emaar Properties, a company 
founded in 1997 with part-state ownership.40 
In the heritage sphere Dubai has also undertaken 
initiatives with strong political messages behind them. 
Perhaps the most interesting in this regard is Dubai 
Heritage Village. This is a state-owned heritage area 
where displays and events recreate traditional life and 
maintain older customs of the littoral Gulf coast area 
in and around Dubai. As Khalaf argues, it is “…a living 
museum, in which cultural representations and displays 
are organized, thematized and presented to viewers as 
discourses of Emirati national culture. Viewed this way, 
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[it] is a cultural complex of invented traditions….”41 
The Village is several things in one. It is a location for 
the presentation of traditional cultural dress, home 
life, symbols, and other meanings to Emiratis. It is a 
reminder – or claim, at least – to the same audience 
that modernity has not eroded historical memory 
or group identity and solidarity, even if arguably it 
has had impacts on them. It is also an international 
advertisement of the area’s culture, identity, and 
traditions to an international audience; a reminder to 
them that contemporary Dubai can embrace the modern 
while retaining the values and traditions of the past. 
V. The Case of Doha, Qatar
On the surface, Qatar may seem to be following 
Dubai’s lead in modernizing its economy, developing its 
urban spaces, and emphasizing its history and heritage. 
This has included large, landmark projects and events 
to establish an international image for the capital, 
Doha. Swift as Doha’s development has been, there are 
substantive distinctions between its modernization and 
that of Dubai’s, especially the greater attention given to 
national and nationalist narratives in many of Doha’s 
major projects and heritage works.
Doha’s major museums are notable in this respect. 
One of the city’s icons is the Museum of Islamic Art,42 
located on the water just off the Corniche near the 
older part of the city. The architecture of the Museum 
building is a blend of the traditional and Islamic with 
the modern and global: the famous Chinese architect 
I. M. Pei, who came out of retirement to design the 
building, used as inspiration a sabīl, or ablutions 
fountain, in the Ahmad Ibn Tulun mosque in Cairo, 
and the angular geometric style of the building’s exterior 
also echoes the traditional Islamic art and architecture 
usage and repetition of mathematically-precise 
geometric patterns. At the same time, the building is 
explicitly modern and international in its design and the 
feeling it generates. The angular features on the exterior 
are reminiscent of early cubism, while the interior has 
a cool, cavernous feel, but with a very modern feel.43 
The intention behind the Museum encompasses both 
the local and the global. The Chair of the Museum, 
Sheikha Al Mayassa bint Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, 
noted around the time of the Museum’s opening that it 
was part of a broader attempt to preserve the heritage 
and promote Qatar abroad: “[T]he challenge for 
every country is to have its people embrace new ideas 
while not forgetting where they come from. Qatar’s 
Museum of Islamic Art serves to place and present 
Arab civilisation in an historical context, while the 
Arab Museum of Modern Art, through contemporary 
displays and exhibitions, is able to reflect the tone of 
current socio-political times. Lastly, we are preparing 
to open the National Museum, which explores and 
displays our own national identity.”44 This statement 
reflects the use of heritage sites for political purposes, 
and it is notable that the range of museums allows 
for both a national narrative, supportive of the ruling 
family’s history and legitimacy, to be pursued alongside 
messages of modernization and globalization. 
Comments on the new National Museum 
mentioned by Sheikha Al Mayassa reaffirm these 
goals. The National Museum’s architect, for example, 
stated that it “…[embodies] the pride and traditions of 
Qatar’s people, while offering international visitors a 
dialogue about rapid change and modernization,” and 
that architecturally, “…the building suggests the image 
of a caravanserai – the traditional enclosed resting place 
that supported the flow of commerce, information and 
people across desert trade routes – and so gives concrete 
expression to the identity of a nation in movement.”45 
Qatar’s museums in conglomeration reflect, therefore, 
a deliberate blending of tradition and national identity 
assertion with a message of internationalism, openness, 
and willingness to (conditionally) change. They are a 
core part of the state’s and regime’s efforts at branding 
the country.46 
There are even cosmopolitan messages in Qatar’s 
museums. The clearest example is Mathaf: Museum of 
Contemporary Art, where there is an overt attempt to 
engage with global arts production and trends, and little 
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reference to Qatari identity, cultural traditions, or values 
beyond the fact that Qatari contemporary artists have 
greater prominence here that at the other museums. 
Mathaf ’s website articulates a goal that comes close to 
promoting a quasi- or pseudo-cosmopolitan message: 
“Mathaf museum hosts exhibitions, programs and 
events that explore and celebrate modern and contemporary 
art and offer an Arab perspective on international art. The 
Museum … opened to the public in 2010, is conceived 
to be used as an inspiring space for dialogue and scholarship 
about modern and contemporary art in Qatar, in the region, 
and in the world. … [The] collection [is] a starting point, 
to create more opportunities for artists and for art-lovers in 
Doha and around the world. [emphases added]”47
Another example from Doha of where imagined 
global images are brought together, somewhat 
uncomfortably, is in the Villaggio Mall. The mall – at 
least until the 2012 fire that killed 19 and led to parts 
of the mall being closed – was designed with a mix 
of international symbols in it. It is most famous for 
the Venetian-style canal that runs through a large part 
of the main thoroughfares of the mall, with gondola 
rides available that rather tackily replicate those on the 
canals of Venice. The Gondolania Theme Park in the 
Mall includes an ice rink, a small rollercoaster and a 
rather American-feeling ten-pin bowling center. In 
combination, these very culturally-different aspects 
of Villaggio all provide a constructed and imagined 
international experience in a public space where 
various groups of Qataris (families, youths, sometimes 
businesspeople and others) gather and interact with each 
other and with expatriates and tourists. While this may 
be a fake or false interaction with other cultures, just as 
US public spaces such as Disneyworld’s cultural displays 
or Las Vegas’ evocation of the Egyptian pyramids are 
artificial constructions, the political messages embedded 
in Qatari malls are quite different to the purposes 
behind Disneyworld or Las Vegas.
VI. Dubai and Doha: Parallels and Distinctions
The exact narratives and symbols used by the 
Gulf states vary noticeably. In part this is because their 
exposure to and experiences of globalization differ. 
Dubai opened to the world economy substantively 
at an earlier time than did Qatar. It had been a very 
open trading port for almost a century48 when it began 
reforming and diversifying its economy in the 1980s.49 
By the mid-1990s this transformation was visibly 
and rapidly advancing, and by the early 2000s Dubai 
was a household name in much of the world. Qatar’s 
transformation has been almost as impressive but came 
later, after Emir Hamad had come to power in 1995 
and once the economic strains of the late-1990s had 
passed; Doha’s dramatic modernization accelerated only 
in the early 2000s.50 Thus, their international economic 
engagement has varied, as have their social and cultural 
approaches to globalization: Dubai has had a broader 
and more liberal engagement with foreign social and 
cultural forces, including relatively liberal policies on, 
for example, mass leisure tourism. Qatar, in contrast, 
has been more cautious about social change and 
cultural influences, including those from mass tourism 
and a surge in its foreign workforce. Both states have 
pursued “branding” strategies that include at least some 
cosmopolitan ideas or imagery, but have also varied in 
this branding, too: Dubai’s has been centered on a 
narrative that Dubai is the friendly, modern, open face 
of the Middle East and is harmonious with Western 
culture, big events, and consumerism; Qatar’s has 
centered on major sporting events, commercial tourism 
and links, and diplomatic initiatives.
The underlying dynamics of the two regimes 
ultimately accounts for their political strategies. 
Dubai’s is in effect a “neo-rentier” post-hydrocarbon 
strategy. The government has sought to build new 
non-hydrocarbon but still rentier-like ways for people 
to make money and to associate this with the state 
and its development strategy. Its stock market and 
property boom were a part of this in the 2000s, while 
more widely, the development of the city as an entrepôt, 
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regional headquarters, and investment center opened 
up enormous opportunities for people to make money 
acting as equity partners, agents, advisers, and other 
business service providers. A similar set of opportunities 
have emerged in Qatar, but the traditional oil and gas 
rentier structure of the economy remains dominant 
there: whereas Dubai’s oil and gas rents now provide 
less than six percent of state revenue, in Qatar they 
were 62 percent of state revenue in 2012‒13,51 and 
even with the fall in energy prices, remain around half 
of state revenue. The Qatari approach to economic 
liberalization has been more restrictive in many areas, 
although state-owned firms dominate its economy, as 
in Dubai.52 The legitimization strategy of their rulers 
is different too: Qatar’s Al Thanis look for popular 
support and legitimacy from the country’s international 
role, economic reach, and support of regional Islamic 
identity, while the Al Maktoums in Dubai focus more 
strongly on economic opportunities and influence – 
regardless, neo-rentierism is present in both political 
economies. Despite the variations in Dubai’s and 
Qatar’s political economies, the language of selective 
internationalization and pseudo-cosmopolitanism 
features in both, with very similar political objectives.
VII.  Cosmopolitanism and “Pseudo-
Cosmopolitanism”
Dubai and Doha both contain various examples 
of state-defined, top-down, globalization-driven (or at 
least globalization-informed and -influenced) projects, 
public spaces, and heritage sites and initiatives, many 
of which contain variations on what is here termed 
“pseudo-cosmopolitanism” as a narrative, symbol, or 
implied message. Whether to serve the purpose of 
justifying state policies, building and consolidating 
nationalist sentiment, or encouraging a sense of 
(qualif ied) internationalism, multiculturalism, 
and adaptability in contemporary society, they are 
examples of pseudo-cosmopolitanism provided that 
they ultimately form part of a state’s identity-building 
and -framing efforts, as opposed to transcending or 
superseding national identity as a more comprehensive 
and genuine cosmopolitanism would do. What is being 
promoted by the state is not anything close to such a 
comprehensive and genuine cosmopolitanism, even if 
occasionally a Gulf citizen might be swayed towards 
such a worldview, including as a result of the state-led 
changes and narratives around him or her. States instead 
are promoting a selective, limited, and often redefined 
conglomeration of certain features of cosmopolitanism, 
framed to deliver the state certain benefits while 
avoiding the political costs that might otherwise 
come from the spread of deeper or wider-ranging 
cosmopolitan identities. Neither cosmopolitanism nor 
pseudo-cosmopolitanism are the sole, or even the most 
important, political element in the public spaces and 
heritage locations of the Gulf. Yet as a dynamic it is 
important; both Dubai and Doha possess heritage and 
public places where cosmopolitanism, globalization, 
or internationalization features as a core, if sometimes 
underlying, theme in their symbolism, meanings, or 
narratives.
To take an example: on the surface, Dubai 
Heritage Village, a public space for the promotion 
of heritage and tradition, does not have a strong 
cosmopolitan message. In fact it could be viewed as 
seeking to constrain deep, genuine cosmopolitanism 
from developing, by acting as a cultural counter-balance 
to Dubai’s rapid modernization and its globalized, 
nationally-detached megaprojects. Yet, to a limited 
extent, even Dubai Heritage Village has a direct if basic 
relationship with (pseudo-)cosmopolitanism: as Khalaf 
notes, the city’s trading history is given prominence in 
the Village’s narratives, with an underlying message 
that its history of commercial contact with the outside 
world is “precursor to [its] entrepreneurial present.”53 
By implication, this includes an open setting for 
interpersonal connections and, both historically 
and (differently) today, as a location for migrant and 
multicultural communities to interact and trade. In such 
ways, the Village brings together state development 
strategy, superficial multiculturalism, and pseudo-
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cosmopolitanism, justifying present policies to both 
Emirati and foreign audiences. This blurs the lines 
between public space, heritage, and politics, using state 
power and funds to define a politically-based narrative 
around and from society’s traditional culture, real or 
imagined, and history.54
In Doha, somewhat similar aims underlie many 
public spaces. There, both branding and nationalism 
are served through public spaces and their attached 
(pseudo-)cosmopolitan and symbols. Even if locations 
such as museums and Villaggio Mall are simply part 
of an attempt at expanding tourism, this has political 
purposes and cultural aspects. Qatar has struggled 
to attract tourists in substantial numbers, at least 
the wealthy sort they desire,55 yet tourism is seen as 
important for both economic diversification and for its 
political value. If managed well, the sector can work 
to strengthen national pride and identity – reminding 
citizens of the international interest in their country 
– and through new business and other opportunities 
can support neo-rentier types of regime legitimization, 
as discussed earlier.56 Qataris and foreign tourists will 
interact with each other, even if in managed ways, but 
often at heritage sites and public spaces; both will gather 
at malls, museums, and historical and archeological 
sites. This makes heritage sites such as the (re-)created 
Souq Waqif marketplace or the new, faux-traditional 
shopping and restaurant Katara village area north of 
Doha very important. At these places, tourists and 
Qataris see each other and may sometimes interact, 
and thus tourism, linking to such locations, reinforces 
the state’s modernization messages. Such messages 
often have pseudo-cosmopolitan elements, which are 
reinforced by the visibility of (well-behaved) tourists 
and citizens’ interactions with them. It matters little 
how genuine these interactions are, just as it matters 
little how truly cosmopolitan the host society is: it is 
the meanings and implications of the state’s narratives 
and symbolism that matter most, provided they are 
effective – not reality.
There is a veneer of cosmopolitanism in the 
Gulf ’s multicultural and polyglot communities and 
in locations where international workers meet and 
interact. These linkages between Gulf societies and 
other cultures have the potential to cross-pollinate 
ideas and transmit cultural features.57 Identity may 
even be shaped to the extent that long-term migrants, 
while almost never obtaining citizenship in a Gulf state, 
may remain there long enough to constitute a specific 
(sub-)group. They become, as Ahmad argues as an 
example, not “Kuwaiti” either culturally or in law, nor 
do they remain “Indian” in the same way as others back 
home, and instead become “Bombay-Kuwaiti,” where 
their social ties, kinship patterns, and some cultural 
practices change into something new and unique over 
their long-term residency in unique Gulf expatriate 
communities.58 The complex conglomerations and 
hybridization of such communities may create a prima 
facie impression of cosmopolitanism, but in fact it is 
not. It may contain some cosmopolitan features, but 
even where residents spend two or three generations 
in a Gulf city, the communities and identities they 
develop may become transnational and cross-cultural, 
even multicultural, but not truly cosmopolitan. Above 
all, they are hybridized cultures, not (usually) culturally-
rootless people absent of any national sentiments. 
Occasionally it is argued that migrant communities 
can form a type of cosmopolitan identity – or as 
Khondker claims, engage in “cosmopolitanism from 
below”59 – but on closer inspection, the evidence for this 
argument (bilingualism, the ability of educated groups 
to communicate across a range of ethnic groups) is more 
that these communities are instead internationalized by 
their location and work and exposed to new experiences 
by globalization. Such groups often are also kept 
separate from others: in many cases, poorer workers 
from developing countries, even if they are quite highly 
educated, have only a limited interaction with Gulf 
citizens or Western expatriates. Their local community 
may also be socially delinked from some others by the 
urban geography of Gulf cities, where “petro-urbanism” 
has led to extensive suburbanization, limited public 
transport, and for the wealthy, sometimes gated 
communities.60 Thus, these communities and locations 
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are at best a manifestation of pseudo-cosmopolitanism.
Above all, such dynamics reinforce the argument 
that what the state is seeking when it narrates 
cosmopolitan messages or uses cosmopolitanism’s symbols 
and imaginations, is not genuine cosmopolitanism. The 
Gulf leaderships hardly want a citizenry that is truly 
cosmopolitan; one that is rootless or de-territorialized 
from the Gulf political geography and the state’s 
nationalist messages, or one where a mass of the 
population would put humanistic values above their 
national, religious, and specific cultural ones. What the 
state instead seeks to do is to create an image around 
a constructed and quasi- or partially cosmopolitan 
identity. In this sense, it is pursuing and responding 
to cosmopolitanism in the same way as it engages with 
globalization; selectively and on its own terms. States 
and leaders are taking advantage of the perceived 
positive attributes of cosmopolitanism, especially 
cultural sophistication, openness to new experiences, 
and an ability to include global perspectives in one’s 
thinking and assumptions, and promoting these 
selectively. Such a limited cosmopolitanism serves the 
state’s interests while posing few threats or risks. The 
very presence of large, varied international communities 
in the Gulf may even be preferable for regimes to an 
indigenous working class, given the political benefit 
to states from a foreign workforce that is financially-
motivated, often only living in the host society for the 
short-term, and which is nearly-always apolitical.61 
The selective use of cosmopolitan language may 
consolidate this benefit further, helping justify the 
state’s narratives of such multicultural societies as 
being a harmony between modernity and development. 
It carries still more potential scope and legitimacy for 
citizens to accept the international labor markets of 
most Gulf states, especially where this means citizens 
are a minority of the population in their societies. It is 
also useful as a message to foreign audiences, as noted 
earlier, when “branding” the economy abroad and 
claiming legitimacy at home.
If such cases of quasi-cosmopolitanism reach 
a point of actually serving nation-state interests and 
supporting, for example, a state’s nationalist aspirations 
and imagery, then this constitutes an inherently false 
or self-contradictory cosmopolitanism. This is why 
the term “pseudo-cosmopolitanism” is used so much 
herein. Even where a cynically formulated cosmopolitan 
narrative appears genuine in aesthetic or descriptive 
terms, and is accepted as genuine by some of its 
audience and embraced, it still constitutes pseudo-
cosmopolitanism where it is state-created and state-
driven, and where the overarching aim of it is actually 
to serve nation-building and political legitimation 
efforts. A cosmopolitan message at a heritage site or 
contemporary art museum – if such messages serve to 
strengthen national identity, nationalist imagery, or 
specific community distinctions – are cases of pseudo-
cosmopolitanism by virtue of their impact being almost 
the opposite of what a genuine cosmopolitan identity 
would be.
The limitations of cosmopolitan political 
narratives are also evidenced in major architectural 
works, which if too cosmopolitan – if too culturally 
rootless or insufficiently distinct from similar projects in 
other cultures – will lose much of their ability to convey 
particular meanings. Perhaps the large public spaces in 
the Gulf are intended to impress the observer, are the 
result of a cultural cringe, or self-consciousness, or are 
just symbols of a leader’s modernization dreams. But 
probably there is more to them. They are often presented 
with such little subtlety to their symbolism or meanings 
that at least part of the reason why they exist is for the 
larger political goals of coopting acquiescence in the 
dramatic socioeconomic transformations that are taking 
place in the Arab Gulf monarchies. That this includes 
messages about the positive impacts of international 
linkages, and even certain elements of cosmopolitanism, 
should not be surprising given the setting in which they 
are conceived, funded, constructed, and promoted.
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